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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BLUE SLIP
The blue slip is the result of the Senate Judiciary Committee's institutionalization of "senatorial courtesy." ' When ajudicial nomination 4 is made, the chair of the Judiciary Committee sends "blue slips" (so called because of the color of paper used) to the senators of the nominee's home state. If even one senator declines to return the slip, then the nomination is dead in the water, or further action will be extremely difficult, depending on which practice the committee chair decides to follow. 5 "Senatorial courtesy" itself is a term that requires some unpacking:
Traditionally, the term senatorial courtesy has referred to the deference the president owes to the recommendations of senators from his own political party on the particular people whom he should nominate to federal offices in the senators' respective states. A second form of senatorial courtesy is the deference a member of Congress, particularly a senator, expects to get from his or her Senate colleagues (or, in the case of a representative, from his Senate counterparts) with respect to his or her own nomination to a confirmable post. Yet another form of senatorial courtesy is the expectation that senators (usually from the president's political party) will confer or consult with the president prior to his nominating people to fill confirmable posts in their fields of expertise .. or people from their respective states to fill national offices.
9 See Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Committee Staff to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 22, 1979) , reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 118, 119 ("The blue slip has been used for over 25 years, according to former committee staff members .... .") [hereinafter Staff Memorandum] .
"0 Id. (describing how the concept ofsenatorial courtesy produced "the institutionalization of the 'blue slip,' whereby the Judiciary Committee formally invites senators from a nominee's home state to disclose opinions and information concerning the nomination").
" Id. (citation omitted). 12 Id. "3 No mention of blue slips is made in the rules posted on the Judiciary Committee's website. See Senate Judiciary History, at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/rules.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) .
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hearing has been scheduled on a nominee in the absence of a returned blue slip" rendering it "an automatic and mechanical one-member veto over nominees. "' 4 The staff noted that presidents "can ignore a senator's personal opposition and attempt to have his nomination confirmed by the Senate;"' 5 but the memorandum also hit upon the power of the blue slip -and what makes it so difficult to study. "Generally," continued the memo, "conflicts are resolved before a name is submitted. In other cases, the nomination may die in committee without any record on whether a withheld blue slip was responsible. "' 6 Senator Kennedy tried to rein in the custom when he assumed the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. In his opening statement to the 1979 hearings on filling judicial vacancies caused by the passage of the Omnibus Judgeship Act, Senator Kennedy stated that he would not "unilaterally table a nomination simply because a blue slip is not returned by a colleague."' 7 He conceded, however, that he could not "discard cavalierly the tradition of senatorial courtesy, exception-riddled and outdated as it may be."' 8 Therefore, in the absence of a blue slip, he proposed to bring the nomination before the Committee for a vote on whether or not to proceed, '4 Staff Memorandum, supra note 9, at 119. According to Attorney General Griffm Bell, in testimony given before the Committee, the custom of a senator's not returning a blue slip may have originated when Senator Richard Russell was forced to declare on the Senate floor that a particular nominee for a district judgeship was "personally obnoxious" to him, after his nominee for the position was passed over by President Truman. See Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 26-27 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell). Apparently, Senator
Russell had entreated Truman's nominee not to accept the nomination, since Russell had already promised the position to someone else, and would be forced to oppose the president's nominee. Id. Attorney General Bell said that, at the time, a senator could not just hold on to the blue slip, but added that he opposed that practice because of the potential for abuse.
Id.
"5 Staff Memorandum, supra note 9, at 120 ("There is obviously a difference between a conflict which occurs before the President normally submits a name for confirmation and one which occurs either in the committee or on the floor of the Senate."). 16 Id. In his opening statement before the Committee, Senator Dennis DeConcini commended Senator Kennedy for having an open debate on the blue slip, characterizing it as "very difficult to even talk about in the open." Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 8 (statement of Senator DeConcini). Testifying before the Committee, a member of Common Cause complained that the secrecy was what made the blue slip process so damaging:
" [W] hen it happens nothing else happens." Id. at 75 (statement of David Cohen). Mr. Cohen stated the position of Common Cause that "any senator who opposes a Federal judicial nominee should present his or her opinions at the public confirmation hearings .... No senator should be allowed to blackball a nominee." Id. at 64 (statement of David Cohen).
" Id. at 4 (statement of Senator Kennedy).
18 Id.
[Vol. 10: 1 BLUE SLIPS: ENFORCING THE NORMS "rather than letting the nomination die . . . ." Thus, said Kennedy, "[t] he committee, and ultimately the Senate, can work its will." 2 The "will," however, that his colleagues -particularly those in the minority party -seemed inclined to "work" was not necessarily in concert with Kennedy's reforming spirit. In his opening statement, which was read by Senator Paul Laxalt, Strom Thurmond "presume [d] that the committee will honor the blue-slip system that has worked so well in the past." 2 ' Not only was this "a matter of senatorial courtesy," but it was also a "means of an effective scrutiny of a candidate .... "" Thurmond's statement noted that "on many occasions [the blue-slip process had] provided insight on a nominee not otherwise presented." 3 In the hearings that followed, Senator Thurmond peppered Attorney General Bell with questions about whether the Carter Administration would proceed with nominees who lacked the support of both of the nominee's home state senators. When Thurmond "presume [d] " that the Administration would observe the "longstanding custom" of the Committee and "would confer with both Senators before even submitting a nomination to the Senate," 24 Bell demurred: "Well, that would get down to whatever the Senate is going to do about the blue slip .... "" He continued, "If there were no blue slip procedure and we wanted to send a name in... I have to say, frankly, we would." 2 6 Thurmond then reminded Bell that doing so "would be reversing the whole precedence and customs in the past" and again "presume [d] 
1]
matter of senatorial responsibility, we should preserve [senators' rights to withhold the blue slip]. I feel strongly about the blue slip process, since it has not been abused, that it should be retained. I hope personally that I never have to utilize it, but I never want to foreclose myself or any of my colleagues in the right case from being able to do that."
That responsibility "to call these tough shots within our States," he added, was "why we are here .... David Cohen, of Common Cause, disagreed, stating unequivocally his organization's position that "the archaic blue slip system" had "turned on its head" the Constitution's allocation of responsibility for nominations and confirmations. 32 "The advice and consent authority," he argued, "has been consolidated in individual senators, denying the entire Senate and the President their constitutional roles." ' 33 The blue slip process "serves narrow political aims and should be abandoned."'"
Aside from the Judiciary Committee hearing discussed above, the only other extensive treatment of the blue slip -and senators' attitudes toward it -is found in an excellent article by political scientist Elliott Slotnick, published in Judicature 3 ' around the same time as the Senate hearings. Apparently, President Carter's decision to employ merit selection panels to fill judicial vacancies, 36 and Senator Kennedy's assumption of the chair of the Judiciary Committee, heralded an era of senatorial glastnost regarding its practices, for Slotnick was able to draw on interviews with senators and their staff members regarding judicial selection, including the blue slip process.
"It was the blue slip procedure," wrote Slotnick, "that institutionalized senatorial courtesy within the Judiciary Committee and created a kind of 'pocket veto' ofjudicial nominees for home state senators of both parties." 37 In recent years (as is evidenced by the comments in the Judiciary Committee), it had become "a major target for the reform groups." 38 But Slotnick's research tended to confirm Senator Laxalt's point that it had not been used that often, and had not been abused by members: "Surprisingly . . . our data reveal that it has not been used very frequently in the manner which its critics fear. 36 See GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 236-84 (discussing judicial selection during the Carter Administration).
" Slotnick, supra note 6, at 63. 38 Id. at 69.
[Vol. 10: 1 BLUE SLIPS: ENFORCING THE NORMS respondents indicated that they had never used the blue slip process for any purpose other than signing off or commenting favorably on a nominee." 39 Of the six respondents that had withheld blue slips, only two did not eventually return it. 4° This suggested to Slotnick that "withholding the blue slip was a delaying tactic which allowed [senators] to make further inquiry and to negotiate on the vacancy -the 'classic' use of the blue slip."'" The two who never returned the blue slip were anomalies; for Slotnick, their withholding constituted a "breakdown in the 'normal' flow of the advice and consent process .... Problems with home state senators presumably will be dealt with before the need for withholding a blue slip arises." 42 (Of course, the threat to withhold a blue slip, like the threat to filibuster, can achieve the same end result, if the threat is taken seriously, and the nomination is never made by the president in the first place. Requiring preclearance of nominees with home state senators itself represents a potential limitation on the president's power to appoint. As Griffin Bell admitted to the Judiciary Committee, 43 without the blue slip a president would not have as much incentive to consult.).
44
The most interesting aspect of Slotnick's research was the "blue slip for me, but not for thee" attitude of many senators. While a majority of the senators he surveyed favored the retention of the blue slip process, a larger majority indicated that their decision to support a nominee or not would not be dictated by a colleague's decision to withhold the blue slip. 4 Even among those senators who favored retaining the process, thirty-nine percent would not defer to colleagues exercising their blue slip prerogative. 46 To Slotnick, this signaled a degradation of certain cherished Senate norms, like reciprocity and courtesy. 47 While those were in evidence in some members' offices, "for the majority of senators, the blue slip was a device which they might or might not want to have at their disposal, but one 
41
See Slotnick, supra note 6, at 70 ("A majority (57 percent) favored the continued existence of the blue slip process; 32 percent thought that the process should be eliminated or the Kennedy reform initiative should be supported"; but 62 percent "also indicated that they would not defer as a matter of course to their colleagues' attempt to block a nomination by withholding a blue slip.").
46 Id.
"7
The classic account of the norms of the Senate -identified as apprenticeship, legislative work, specialization, courtesy, reciprocity, and institutional patriotism-is found in DONALD MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 94-117 (1960) . These Senate "folkways" are summarized and described briefly in Denning, Reforming the New Senate Confirmation Process, supra note 1, at 15.
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which they were clearly uncomfortable about in the hands of their colleagues. This inconsistency appeared again and again in our interviews," he wrote. 4 " He might have added that, if forced to choose, most senators would evidently support their colleagues only to ensure that their exercise of the prerogative would be supported in the future.
If so much distrust surrounded the procedure, then why had it been retained? For some, wrote Slotnick, tradition was enough. 49 Others suggested that its presence preserved consensus and harmony among senators by offering an "early warning" system of sorts that could help avoid embarrassing and acrimonious controversies from occurring either in Committee or on the Senate floor. 5 " Still other senators invoked the historic reason for deferring to senators' wishes regarding nominees: home state senators are in the best position to evaluate a nominee and provide unique insights. 5 One obvious reason for retaining the custom is that it forces an administration -even if of a different party than the senator -to deal directly with that senator onjudicial nominations, thus enhancing her prestige. Perhaps even more important is the fact that it ensures that senators of the minority party can play a significant role in the nomination process. Not surprisingly, ninety-four percent of Republicans responding to Slotnick's study favored retaining the blue slip process." "The minority party," he concluded, "will apparently do whatever is necessary to maintain a meaningful role in the judicial recruitment process." 53 Still, despite the controversy generated by the process, Slotnick was able to conclude in 1980 that "the blue slip system is rarely used and it often serves some other purpose than defeat of a nominee. Its major function seems to be to delay, not to defeat, a nomination." 4 Members continued to support it because it was a Senate custom; because they were more senior; because it helped secure "state's rights"; because they were members of the minority party; or some combination thereof. 5 48 Slotnick, supra note 6, at 70 ("[M]ost of our respondents were satisfied that they wouldn't use the blue slip procedure arbitrarily, yet they were not willing to make the same assumption about their colleagues."); see also 58 During the years that the Republicans controlled the Senate during the Clinton Administration (1995-2000) "it brought judicial confirmations to a virtual standstill throughout... 1996 (confirming... only seventeen judgeships) and again for most of 1997 (confirming thirty-six in all); and in 1998 and 1999 it confirmed a smaller percentage of Clinton's judicial nominees than it did in the corresponding years in the Reagan and Bush administrations." GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 114. This is in spite of Clinton's genuine effort to consult with senators and to avoid controversial nominees. Id. at 122-23. At least some of these failed nominations came at the hands of Senator Jesse Helms, who singlehandedly blocked all of President Clinton's nominations to the Fourth Circuit. state tojudgeships. 6 " Democrats on the Judiciary Committee were angered by thenChairman Orrin Hatch's plan to require both home-state senators to withhold slips before sinking a nomination, which Democrats alleged was an abrupt change in the way Hatch had treated blue slips during the Clinton Administration. 6 2
The issue became so contentious that Democrats, furious at Republican refusals to adhere to past practices, staged a walk out that delayed a vote on the nominations of President Bush's nominees for solicitor general and deputy attorney general. 63 Then-minority leader Daschle raised the stakes by declaring that Democrats in the Senate would "block Senate votes on judicial nominations unless both senators from the nominee's home state [were] willing to go along with the choice."" In other words, the Democrats were threatening either to place holds on or filibuster Bush judicial nominations, unless they were assured that Democrats in states whose delegations were split would have the opportunity to blue-slip judicial nominees to whom they objected -which would ensure that the administration would have an incentive to consult with Democrats before formally announcing nominations. Hatch's statement, Leahy reportedly swore, informed Totenberg that "we'll follow the rule the same way Senator Hatch followed it during the last six years," and stalked off to find his Republican colleague. 
65
In California, the Bush Administration has already worked out a system for ensuring that its nominees from that state will not be blocked by both of the state's Democratic senators. In brief, six-member, bipartisan nominating commissions were set up with three Published reports about the blue slip and its function in the confirmation process were rather vague. Reporters for the Washington Post described it only as a custom that "dates back at least several decades and is rooted in the tradition of 'senatorial courtesy,' which traces its roots to the presidency of George Washington." 66 It was also unclear from published reports whether failure to return a blue slip was a death blow to a nomination, as Democrats claimed; or, as Senator Hatch argued, "never an absolute bar to proceeding with a nomination . "..."67 While the question whether Hatch would or would not follow through on his apparent volteface was mooted with Senator Jim Jeffords' defection from the GOP, which returned control of the Senate to the Democrats, the issue of the blue slip and its role in the confirmation process did not go away.
A few days after control switched to the Democrats, the blue slip again made the news when California Senator Barbara Boxer announced her intent to use her prerogative to nix the nomination of California Representative Christopher Cox to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 68 As a result, Cox asked President Bush to withdraw his name from consideration. 6 9 Paul Gigot and William Safire criticized Boxer's move, and criticized the blue slip process, likening it to a "blackball ' 7 0 and a "burial shroud ' 71 for nominees. 
Democrats and three Republicans to recommend judicial nominations in each of
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Whether or not the non-return of a blue slip would be the death knell for judicial nominees became one of the most hotly contested issues confronting the Senate as it set about reorganizing following the assumption of control by the Democrats. What followed was an outbreak of chutzpah on both sides: Republicans demanded floor votes on all of the president's judicial nominees, regardless of whether they received a favorable vote in committee; Democrats refused such blanket assurances, claiming that such a move would undermine the Senate's "advice and consent" role. 7 " In particular, Republicans were looking for a guarantee that "President Bush's choices for the Supreme Court come before the full Senate for consideration even if defeated in committee." 7 The new majority leader, Senator Daschle, then agreed to hold votes on that issue and a vote on whether the blue slip policy would be continued, as well as whether the non-return of blue slips would be made public. 74 In the end, Democrats only assured Republicans that they would follow the "tradition of bringing Supreme Court nominees to the Senate floor but stopped short of any iron-clad commitments."" Republicans, however, did get an agreement that all blue slips would be made public. 76 blue-slipped by the home-state senator, could theoretically get a hearing provided the president begged the senator's permission in advance." Id. News coverage of the Senate spat did raise the visibility of the blue slip, and also exposed it to criticism." However, the coverage did not do much to explain its origins or past practice; some coverage seemed to confuse it with the "hold." It is nevertheless instructive to compare the blue slip process circa 2001 with the process as described by Slotnick above. Though the secrecy shrouding the process -which has only recently been lifted 7 " -makes it difficult to say for sure, it appears that, in the past ten years, the fears of the blue slip's critics have been realized.
If Senator Helms's continued obstruction of any North Carolina nominees to the Fourth Circuit, and Senator Boxer's treatment of Christopher Cox, are at all representative, the blue slip is now seen as a means to defeat, not merely delay, a nominee and perhaps prevent the nomination from being made in the first place. Such an evolution is not without a precedent: witness the hold's evolution from an accommodation to members who cannot be present for a debate to a blue slip process writ large, in which legislation and nominees can be held up by any senator, for any reason, as long as the leadership decides to honor the hold. 79 That she chose http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/blueslips I.htm (last visited Nov. 6,2001 ). This will ensure against Senate backsliding on the promise to make all blue slips public, and will provide scholars with valuable information on the frequency with which blue slips are withheld and for how long. It would be interesting to see, for example, whether the withholding of blue slips in general, and their withholding in an effort to defeat (as opposed to delaying) a nominee are more intense during periods of divided government. My thanks to Glenn Reynolds for alerting me to the blue slip page on the DOJ's website.
" In general, editorial commentary was uniformly negative, with many newspapers calling for its abolition. At least, they argued, blue slips should be made public, as they to threaten withholding her blue slip on ideological grounds, as opposed to any other manifest unfitness for office, suggests that Senator Boxer was taking advantage of an established practice. That is, in none of the news reports was she criticized by her colleagues for breaking with tradition. While conservative pundits criticized her action, they seemed to take it only as a symptom of the problem with the custom itself. All of this suggests that the Republicans likely used the blue slip process in the same way.
Moreover, the withdrawal of Cox from consideration demonstrates the real power of the blue slip: a senator need not use it in a direct confrontation with the administration over a nominee. Just letting it be known that the senator is opposed and would, if the person is nominated, withhold the blue slip, sends a powerful signal that trouble is in the offing. Then the administration must decide whether or not it wants to pick a fight. With judicial nominations, then, the Senate has created an effective procedure for ensuring that its "advice" is sought by the president prior to the announcement of a nomination, despite suggestions that that function has been "short-circuited." 0
III. IS THE BLUE SLIP PROCESS ONSTITUTIONAL?
Elliott Slotnick noted twenty years ago that the blue slip process was inconsistent with a "minimalist" view of the confirmation process."' To be sure, its presence represents a rather more complicated picture of nomination and confirmation than that suggested by Article II. But is it -and the delays for nominees that it produces -unconstitutional?
2 While I conclude that the blue slip process and the senatorial courtesy norm that it enforces cannot find explicit sanction in the Constitution, the evidence for its proscription by the Constitution is lacking as well. Article H, of course, grants presidents the power to nominate judges, who are appointed when they obtain the "advice and consent" of the Senate. 3 Defending the system in The Federalist,"' Hamilton praised it for its transparency and its clear One might say the same about the blue slip process. First, it dilutes the power of the executivd to appoint whomever he wishes. 90 Knowing of the blue slip process, and of senators' expectations that the president will appoint their people for certain posts, can we assign unqualified responsibility to the president for those appointments? Second, the secrecy with which the blue slip operates (or operated, if the present agreement holds) also diffuses responsibility and reduces transparency in the process. If a senator can withhold a blue slip, give no reason, and the public knows nothing about it, what is the check upon extreme abuses, like those seen during the Clinton Administration? But the most serious constitutional objection (hereinafter, all citations are to this edition). 
(emphasis added).
86 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing that Senate confirmation "would have a powerful... operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.").
id.
88 Id. at 434. 'o While senatorial courtesy has long dictated that presidents consult with senators about appointments made to positions inside their own home states, that normusually only operated with great force when the senator and the president were of the same party. See Harris, supra note 3, at 39 ("The custom of senatorial courtesy is the sanction by which a majority of the Senate may require the President to nominate the candidate proposed by the senator or senators from the state in which the office is located, provided they belong to the same party as that of the President.").
is that it allows individuals to exert what is supposed to be an institutional check. A single senator withholding consent, and depriving the Senate as a body from voting a nominee up or down, is difficult to square with the Constitution, which specifies that it is the Senate (not "senators") which is to provide "advice and consent."'" While the Constitution authorizes the Senate to make its own rules, 9 2 recall that there has not been a formal rule from the Judiciary Committee authorizing the rule for nearly a half century. 93 On the other hand, the Senate is not only expected to "consent" to nominations, but also to give "advice" regarding them. The Constitution, of course, does not explicitly set forth an advice-giving mechanism, but the text does anticipate more than a rubberstamp role for the Senate. 94 To put it another way, the Constitution establishes an expectation that the president will actively seek the guidance of senators in making appointments. But since the power to appoint is clearly vested by the Constitution in the president, and there is no mention of how, exactly, he is supposed to obtain the advice of the Senate, 95 there is no way to assure that he will do so. Moreover, because he alone is vested with the power to appoint, it is unlikely that the Senate could persuade a court to invalidate a presidential nomination on the grounds that it was made without sufficient advice from the Senate. 96 Thus, in the absence of an effective legal sanction, the Senate had to create a sanction that would penalize a president's refusal to seek Senate advice. The Senate decided to "encourage" him to consult with them by creating a way to sanction him if he does not -the blue slip.
The next section explores further the notion that the blue slip represents the Senate's institutionalized sanction for presidential deviation from senatorial courtesy by employing concepts developed in recent legal literature on cooperation in the absence of legal sanction through the development and use of social norms.
9'
Of course, the Senate cannot act but through its members; the point is that allowing two out of 100 to scuttle a nomination does not square with the majority rule requirement implied by Article II. 9' See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
" GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 26. 
IV. THE BLUE SLIP AS SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF CONFIRMATION NORMS
A. Institutional Norms and Their Enforcement
There is a growing body of literature that uses law-and-economics to describe how and why people cooperate in the absence of legal sanction and how non-legal "norms" are derived and enforced in communitiesY. Though even among the specialists in this area, there is no one agreed upon definition for a "norm," most agree that it is a behavioral expectation, deviation from which may call down a sanction from the community in which the norm is operative. 9 In order to achieve cooperation from other members of the relevant community, we all publicize our adherence to social norms by engaging in (or abstaining from) behaviors regulated by the norms through activities known as "signaling." 99 Thus, as Eric Posner puts it, we signal to one another our status as people of the "good" type, and thus can be counted on to cooperate in any contemplated relationship, as contrasted with untrustworthy people of the "bad" type. 00 As Michael Gerhardt has recently demonstrated, one might also extend norm theory to an institutional relationship, like that of the president to the Senate in the confirmation process.' 0 ' Within the subclass of institutional norms, he writes, "is a subset that involves the behavioral regularities of the leaders of national political institutions over shared areas of responsibility, including . . . appointments 2001]1 matters."' 2 He further defines these institutional appointments norms as the "behavioral regularities of presidents and senators regarding appointments that persist in the absence of formal rules and that deviations from which trigger sanctions."' ' 3 In an earlier work, I described how the growing polarization of the confirmation process in recent years was a symptom of the steady degradation of U.S. Senate norms whose decline began in the early 1960s.' 04 In this section, I will make the suggestion that the blue slip process is the sanction that a president faces for violating the norm of senatorial courtesy. Looking at the confirmation process as a game requiring the continued cooperation of both the president and the Senate, it becomes clear that the game' 0 5 has certain norms -certain expectations of "behavioral regularities" -and that sanctions are imposed for deviations from those norms. The blue slip process can be seen as a type of sanction that has evolved to police observance of the confirmation process norms.
One of the most important norms enforced by the Senate is that the president feel obligated to seek senators' advice when the position is located within their state; or, more recently, when the potential nominee is from their state. This is one aspect of "senatorial courtesy" -and one with deep historical roots. When President Washington failed to seek the advice from the Georgia senate delegation regarding a nomination for a federal position in Savannah, Washington was forced to withdraw the nomination in favor of the person recommended by the senators.' 0 6
While Article H's failure to provide any formal advice-giving process has led some to the erroneous conclusion that "advice and consent" was merely a term of art and not to be understood literally, or that the "advice" component has fallen into desuetude, the persistence of the courtesy norm and the evolution of the blue slip suggest the opposite. One could see the Georgia senators' move against Washington's nominee as a reaction to a violation of the expectation, created by the language of Article II itself, that the president would consult the senators prior to making formal nominations. As Harold Chase has observed, other senators were willing to support their colleagues in their opposition to the president's choice because it was "easy for senators to see that if they joined together against the president to protect their individual interests in appointments, they could to a large 102 Id. at 1688 n.3. 10I ld. at 1688. '0o See Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process, supra note 1, at 10-29.
Studies of social norms use as a model a game between two or more persons who, lacking information about the intentions of the other, and lacking an efficient legal enforcement mechanism, have to make decisions about whether or not to cooperate to achieve some common goal. In order to build up trust, parties signal to one another that they are of the "good" type that can be trusted. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 97, at 13-27.
.06 The incident is described in CHASE, supra note 3, at 10, and Slotnick, supra note 6, at 62-63. [Vol. I0:1 BLUE SLIPS: ENFORCING THE NORMS degree assure that the president could only make such appointments as would be palatable to them as individuals."' 0 7 Both the decision to oppose Washington's appointment and the other senators' decision to support their colleagues in standing against the president were signals. To the president, the senators signaled an intention to regard pre-nomination consultation as a norm of the confirmation process. The other senators signaled to their Georgia colleagues that they could be counted on to support them in their decision, and, consequently, that they would be worthy of similar support in the future. The president, on the other hand, by withdrawing the nomination, clearly signaled to the whole Senate that he recognized the validity of the advice norm, and would abide by it.'
B. The Evolution of the Advice Norm as an Aspect of Senatorial Courtesy
Though early presidents resisted 0 9 an expectation eventually emerged that presidents would, in fact, consider names for certain governmental posts from the senators and representatives in whose states or districts those persons would serve. Though it necessarily involved surrendering some of the executive power to nominate, this norm was essential because of (i) the increase in the number of federal offices by the mid-nineteenth century; and (ii) the inability of the president to evaluate candidates for those positions." 0 By the twentieth century, as one comnentator noted:
[T]he custom of Congressional "advice" was thoroughly systematized by the Republicans. Not only were the Senators officially recognized as the "referees" in the case of state-wide positions; but if there were two administration Senators, and especially if they were not harmonious, they made formal agreements dividing the patronage [in the state]."
10 As Chase noted, the effort to establish an advice norm may well have failed had Washington, with his unparalleled reputation and prestige, opposed the Georgia delegation. See CHASE, supra note 3, at 10. Eric Posner notes that some high-status people can violate norms with impunity because it is too costly to others to refuse to cooperate with him or her. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 27-29.
"o See Fowler, supra note 6, at 25-39; Harris, supra note 3, at 38-39. "o See Fowler, supra note 6, at 44 (" [W] ithout Congressional action and appropriations it was difficult to establish a means other than the advice of Congressmen of obtaining reliable information as to applicants for the local offices."); see also id. at 57.
.. Id. at 49.
20011
Despite the efforts of nineteenth century reformers and "strong" twentieth century presidents" 2 (like the two Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson) this norm was considered firmly established by the mid-twentieth century."' The norm was not, however, static. For example, prior to the 1950s, the custom was described by political scientist Joseph Harris as operating in the following manner, which is worth quoting in full:
Under the custom any member of the Senate may block the confirmation of a nomination by stating that the nominee is "personally obnoxious" or offensive to him. In the past it has not been necessary for the senator to do more than merely indicate his opposition to a nomination, and repeat the customary formula. An objection to a nomination does not mean that the nominee is actually "personally obnoxious" to the objecting senator; it frequently involves no animus whatever, but merely indicates that the senator has another candidate. Formerly it was not necessary or expected that the objecting senator give any reasons to support his objection .... Usually he advised the chairman of the committee to which the nomination had been referred, and the nomination was not reported to the Senate.' ' Harris noted, however, that "in recent years the objecting senator has been expected to state his reasons so that the Senate can judge whether they are sufficient.""' In several cases he described, senators gave, as the reason for opposition, the fact that the president had ignored (or at least not actively sought) senators' advice on his nominees." 6 In one particular case, Georgia Senator Richard Russell, in asking the Senate to oppose a judicial nomination made by President Truman for which Russell preferred another candidate, stated that senators "have a right to believe that if the man they recommend is qualified the recommendation will be followed."' ' 7 Otherwise, Russell warned, "the constitutional power of the Senate to advise and consent to a nomination means nothing; it has no significance." ' The president's nomination, he continued, was "contrary to custom, and in defiance of the 112 See id. at 53-56.
'13 See Harris, supra note 3, at 36-38 (describing the conflict between Illinois Senator Paul Douglas and President Harry Truman over two federal district court judgeships, in which Douglas "appealed to the courtesy of the Senate in opposing" the president's nominees The Senate's support of Senator Russell and others came after a short period of time during which stating personal opposition was not sufficient to block a confirmation -reasons needed to accompany the charge of "obnoxiousness" so that the Senate could evaluate them.'
C. Contrasting the Courtesy Norm and the Blue Slip
Thus, the advice norm clearly preceded the blue slip,' and was enforced through the support of colleagues on which objecting senators might count as an aspect of the Senate's courtesy. It is interesting, however, to note a few differences between the courtesy norm and the blue slip. In his classic article on the norm, Joseph Harris noted that the contests usually arose "between the President and members of the Senate... when the President declines to nominate the candidate proposed by a senator of his party, ordinarily on the ground that the... nominee is not qualified." 2 3 A more common objection at the time Harris was writing (1952) was-the so-called "personal" objection "entered when the objecting senator concedes that a nominee is fully qualified" but whom the senator nevertheless opposes, often because "the nominee is a political opponent of the [objecting] senator ....
The point is that ideological opposition did not play a large role, or at least workaday "political" concerns were more often the root source of controversies. This is not surprising considering the second point that Harris " Id. (quoting Russell) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 Id. On the same day, the Senate also rejected another district court nominee from Iowa to whom its senator objected because the president again ignored his recommendation as to who should fill the position. Id.
121 Id. at 62 ("For a period it appeared that the Senate would limit the use of the rule by requiring objecting senators to state their reasons, and sustain the objections only if they were found sufficient, but in the last several years the trend has been in the opposite direction.").
122 One interesting question is the part that Richard Russell played in devising the blue slip procedure. Recall Griffin Bell's testimony that the procedure arose because of Senator Russell's fight with Truman over a district court judgeship. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The controversy of which Judge Bell spoke is very likely the one Harris wrote about in his article, which occurred in 1950. See supra notes 114-121. The staff memorandum on the blue slip prepared for Senator Kennedy in 1979 mentioned that the blue slip procedure had existed for about twenty-five years. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. That would mean that it had come into existence sometime in the early 1950s -right about the time of the appointment flap with Russell.
123 Harris, supra note 3, at 37. 124 Id. at 44.
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL makes: that the advice norm was strongest when the president and the objecting senator were of the same political party. Though senators of the minority party, wrote Harris, "may enter a personal objection to a nominee," and some had been sustained, the custom was that any objection should be based on purely personal grounds. As he admitted, however, "in practice it is frequently difficult to distinguish between personal and political objections."' 2 5 (Note that "political" as Harris used the term means that the nominee is a political rival of the senator, not necessarily that there is an ideological objection.) As we have seen, though, the blue slip is available to all members of the Senate." 6 Moreover, senators are extremely sensitive about diluting the power of the mechanism by requiring opposition from both senators.
Another interesting feature of the courtesy norm circa 1950 is that senators were somewhat limited in the offices to which they could object. For example, when Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi objected to a circuit court of appeals nominee, he was forced to lodge a personal objection to the nominee because "the judicial circuit included five or six states, [and] a senator from any one of the states could not claim the right to name the person to be appointed to the vacancy .".."'27 Harris also commented that objections "against nominees to national offices by a senator from the state of residence of the nominee" is "uncommon;" "courtesy is ordinarily invoked only against appointments to offices located within the state of the objecting senator."' 28 Not so for the blue slip, which is available for all judicial nominations -except those to the United States Supreme Court.
125 Id. at 45-46.
126 Harris, who was a critic of senatorial courtesy, ridiculed the notion that the President had a constitutional obligation to consult with the Senate prior to making nominations (as often repeated by many senators). This would mean, Harris wrote (offering what he no doubt thought was the perfect reductio ad absurdum), that "the President would be required to consult with senators of the opposite party as well as those of his own party -something which no one has ever contended." Id. at'60. This, too, has become part of the expectation with judicial nominations. 
D. Summary
The blue slip is the formal sanction for violation of the Senate norm of the courtesy from presidents, who are expected to seek advice from Senators prior to making judicial appointments. Prior to the mid-1950s, the sanction was largely available only to senators of the president's own party who either objected to a president's consideration of a nominee to an office inside that senator's state who was (i) a political rival for a position in that senator's state; or (ii) who simply was not the senator's preferred candidate. Moreover, an objecting senator had to make his objection publicly, and was sometimes even required to state his objections with some specificity, which his colleagues would then weigh.
Under the blue slip regime, on the other hand, senators of either party are entitled to indicate their disapproval of a judicial nominee from their state by withholding a slip of paper distributed to them by the Judiciary Committee. According to Senate custom, if even one senator from a state withholds the slip, the nomination will not go forward. While formerly used primarily to delay candidates, the blue slip has been used with increasing frequency to defeat nominees. Until a new agreement was reached between Republicans and Democrats on the Judiciary Committee in the summer of 2001, the identity of the senator withholding the blue slip was secret.
Like the arguments employed on behalf of the courtesy norms of which Joseph Harris wrote, many senators defend the blue slip process as necessary to encourage the executive branch to respect what senators see as a constitutional obligation to seek advice from senators prior to making certain judicial nominations. For its part, members of the executive branch have, in candid moments, admitted that without the blue slip, presidents would have little incentive to vet nominees with home state senators. Despite its lack of explicit sanction in the Constitution, the mechanism is an outgrowth of norms that are not only suggested by the Constitution (i.e., the Senate is supposed to render "advice and consent," not just "consent"), but also that have existed since the Washington Administration.
V. CAN WE PINK SLIP THE BLUE SLIP?: POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM As Judge Richard Posner correctly observes, "Norms, like laws, can be bad.. 12, Even if they happen to be "efficient within the group in which they are felt as binding, they may be dysfunctional for society as a whole. . ,,1o Thus, what norms are operative in the confirmation process and what norms are good ones are separate questions. Despite the difficulty one has pronouncing the process unconstitutional, the blue slip is clearly at odds with the advertised benefits of dividing responsibility for nomination and confirmation between the president and the Senate.' Moreover, recent evidence suggests that, like the hold, changes in the Senate itself have allowed the blue slip to evolve into an offensive, not a defensive, weapon; and that internal norms that once checked abuses have degraded.' 32 The question then arises, "Can the norm be altered?" Could the blue slip pro~ess be scrapped? Or at least replaced with something else? The answer is yes, but the alteration or destruction of norms, or a norm-enforcement mechanismparticularly one with deep historic roots -can be quite difficult." 33 Professor Gerhardt has argued that uncertainty surrounding the scope of a norm ("norm ambiguation")' 3 ' and the willingness of political actors actively to seek the creation of new norms ("norm entrepreneurship")' may "create... context [s] in which the development of a new norm is possible. ' " 3 ' The early Georgia senators, for example acted as norm entrepreneurs by creating the advice norm that resulted in Washington's withdrawal of his nominees for the post in Savannah. Similarly, President Carter's norm entrepreneurship, demonstrated by the creation of nominating committees to fill judicial vacancies, temporarily resulted in a period of norm ambiguity, which Senator Kennedy then tried to exploit by modifying the existing blue slip procedure. And, before the Jeffords defection, Senate Republicans attempted to engage in norm entrepreneurship by requiring both senators to withhold blue slips to scuttle a nomination, after years of permitting only one senator to halt a nominee. ' Keeping in mind the difficulties that inhere in changing a norm or creating a new norm, there are some indications that reform may be possible now that power in the Senate has changed hands. I argue below that recent controversies may have unsettled the advice norm that gave rise to the blue slip enough that it could not withstand an assault by an entrepreneur committed to changing the norm.
First, the Senate itself will soon experience significant personnel changes; specifically, the retirement of Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms. Senator Thurmond was a vociferous supporter of the blue slip; Senator Helms often took ... See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
'32 For more on these changes in the Senate itself, see Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process, supra note 1, at 14-25.
133 POSNER, supra note 97, at 300 ("Creating a norm requires promulgation of the norm and the creation of sanctions for its violation. Eliminating a norm requires promulgation, too, and also the destruction of the expectations and tastes that support the sanctions for its violation -a process.., that may be as costly as their creation in the first place. Changing a norm, which requires elements of both destruction and creation, can be the most difficult trick of all.").
3 Gerhardt, supra note 101, at 1696. advantage of the procedure to stop unwanted judicial nominations from seeing the light of day. Recall that Elliott Slotnick, in his survey of senators' attitudes towards the blue slip, found that seniority and majority/minority status were often significant factors in a senator's favoring the retention of the procedure.' 38 The older a senator was, the more likely he was to support the blue slip; support among minority senators for the procedure was nearly unanimous. Now, however, some of the blue slip's most ardent proponents have retired, or will retire soon. Unless other, younger senators approach the issue with the passion of the older senators, the departure of the older members alone may spur change.' Further contributing to the possible destabilization of the norm and its enforcement mechanism may be the unfavorable press coverage the blue slip has recently received. Reaction to the blue slip by national and regional commentators was universally negative.' 4° The idea that a single senator could, because of mere partisan pique, disqualify an otherwise qualified nominee from a judicial position without so much as a good reason strikes most as absurdly unfair. The public reaction following revelations of other individual abuses of power in the Senate, like the filibuster or the hold, was similar. 4 '
The return of the Democrats to power in the Senate may also affect the future of the blue slip. After years of complaining that scores of Clinton judges were held hostage to members' whims, Democrats will be under pressure not to pay Republicans back, lest they look like rank hypocrites. But what on the surface appears to be a frustrating restraint on a power that Republicans wielded lustily against Democratic judicial nominees may actually be a golden opportunity for Democrats to serve as norm entrepreneurs in changing the blue slip process.
Because of public pressure not to appear to be giving as good as they got at the hands of Republicans, Democrats may be inhibited in the full exercise of their blue slip power. If they cannot do so, then perhaps they are in the best position to effect reform. Reforming the blue slip process would enable Democrats to (i) respond to negative public opinion about the blue slip procedure, thus allowing them to claim the progressive, reformist mantel and mark opponents as hidebound protectors of undemocratic privilege; and (ii) possibly ease the way for the judicial nominations of a future Democratic president, even if reform inured to the immediate benefit of President Bush and his nominees. Democrats could always muster support to defeat a truly unacceptable nomination, but having Bush's nominees reap the short-term benefits means that Republicans in the Senate may be more likely to go along.
.3 Slotnick, supra note 6, at 73; see also supra text accompanying note 55. ,' With the older members may also go the old Senate folkways like institutional patriotism and courtesy.
140 See supra note 76. ... See Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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Assuming that the possibility of reforming the blue slip process exists, what types of reforms should be attempted? One possibility is that the Senate could "end it, not mend it;" but given senators' perceptions that they have a constitutional role to play in the giving of advice (which has been reinforced through the years), total abandonment is unlikely. If it is to exist, what reforms might be undertaken to make it more consistent with the Constitution's division of power between the president and the Senate -a division that was expected to ensure accountability and transparency in the process?
One reform that would help restore both would be to memorialize the custom in a Senate, or at least a Judiciary Committee rule. The slip itself suggests that some rule did exist, at one time. " ' At a minimum, such a rule should specify that the withholding of a blue slip will be made public by the chair of the Judiciary Committee, even if the chair is the one doing the withholding. Second, senators should be required to communicate their objections to the chairman or to the White House. Further, consistent with past practice, the withholding of a blue slip should be a signal that the administration needs to confer with a senator, and not an automatic death sentence for the nominee, especially if the senator is in the minority. Therefore, some time limit on how long a blue slip could be withheld should be considered. After a reasonable period of time to resolve differences with the White House, a senator should be required to make her case to her colleagues indicating her objections to the nominee, ask for their support, and have the Senate decide, as a body, whether or not it wishes to go along. 43
142 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. There may be some objections raised to reducing the blue slip custom to writing; these are worth mentioning. First, any such rule would, by its nature, be public. Publicity invites scrutiny, and the Senate may face more criticism if the procedure is spelled out in its rules, or in one of its committee's rules-(This objection has been blunted somewhat by the agreement to make public who is withholding blue slips.) Second, while a rule would be helpful to eliminate the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the practice -over whether one or two blue slips must be withheld to kill a nomination, for example -that ambiguity may be useful to senators who can use it to their advantage when they are in power. Third, reducing the custom to a rule would imply a reaffirmation of the blue slip procedure by fixing it in the Senate rules. Given the criticism of the process, senators may prefer to leave it unwritten and thus make use of a preexisting custom without having to endorse it publicly. Fourth, committing the Senate to this one sanction might stifle the evolution of other means to ensure consultation by the executive branch. Finally, senators might hesitate to write a rule for this custom, lest there be pressure to codify other practices, like the "hold," or modify jealously-guarded prerogatives like the filibuster.
43 Such reforms might also be coupled with other needed procedural reforms in the Senate, such as the number of votes needed to invoke cloture, so that a disappointed senator could not bring the work of the Senate to a standstill. For a discussion of how these reforms might be accomplished, see Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process, supra note 1, at 31-41.
[Vol. 10: 1 BLUE SLIPS: ENFORCING THE NORMS Of course, it is just as likely that nothing will happen, just as nothing really happened in 1979, despite Senator Kennedy's attempts at reform. Even if the Senate is not inclined to undertake a reform on the order of what I suggested above, it still may be encouraged to exercise its power judiciously. One way to do so would be for the White House to make the confirmation of its judicial nominees a priority;"' and, while respecting the expected confirmation norms, be willing to publicly criticize senators (of either party) who abuse the blue slip. Given the unfavorable press coverage the procedure has received, senators forced to explain on television that they are holding up the president's nominees because of tradition might think twice before making habitual use of the blue slip.
CONCLUSION
The blue slip process has evolved as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of the norm that presidents are to seek the advice of senators before making judicial nominations. The advice norm emerged early in our history and represents one aspect of "senatorial courtesy." In recent years, however, the degradation of norms that held abuses of Senate power in check has rendered the blue slip susceptible to abuse, the effects of which were realized first during the Clinton Administration and have already affected President Bush's judicial nominations. I have argued here that the evolution of both the norm and of a mechanism for its enforcement is understandable if the Senate's advice role was not to become an ineffective adjunct to its consent role. Nevertheless, its operation has undermined the twin virtues of accountability and transparency that were seen as the strengths of the Constitution's arrangement for confirming nominees to government office. Since circumstances now exist that make thoughts of reform possible, I suggest that the Senate commit the practice to a rule, either at the Committee level or the Senate level; or, in the alternative, that the executive branch take a more active role in identifying and publicizing what it perceives to be abuses of the procedure during the confirmation process.
'"
Professor Gerhardt suggests that by not making judicial nominations a high priority, and not standing by its nominees, the Clinton Administration essentially courted controversy.
See GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 123-24.
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